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Abstract This study examines the pro-democracy protests of Hong Kong in 2014 and
how the protests became sites for Beijing’s representations of Chinese national im-
age(s). It argues that ‘defensive soft power’ can be used to understand the process
through which Beijing made such representations and projections. ‘Defensive soft
power’, extending on Nye’s soft power is operationally defined as the reactionary
activities taken in response to actions that harm or potentially harm a country’s national
image. Based on an analysis of the data drawn from three mainland news media,
several perceptions of China emerge - China as a victim; China as ‘reasonable’ power;
and China as benign and tolerant leader in the China-Hong Kong relation. This research
highlights the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ as an instance where ‘defensive soft power’ was
used to (1) fend off negative national images and (2) project positive national images.
Mapping out the process of national image defence will enable readers to better
understand a sovereign state’s strategies to defend attacks on and promote positive
perceptions of its national image.
Keywords Chinese soft power.HongKong .Umbrella revolution . Contentious politics
Introduction
One of the main Hong Kong protest movements of 2014, also known popularly as the
‘Umbrella Revolution’, was a series of protests that began in September 2014 and
ended in mid-December that same year. The protestors – comprised mainly of students
and youths – occupied areas in Central, Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok
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bringing traffic in these places to a standstill [1]. The movement’s sheer size and
geographical spread is unprecedented with three ‘occupation zones’ located in the
city’s prime administrative hub and two major shopping areas with its epicentre in
the government’s headquarters in Admiralty. The catalyst for the street protests was the
decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in mainland
China to pre-approve candidates to run for elections in the Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council - even if the candidates receives at least 1 % endorsement by the electorate.
The authority to pre-screen and select candidates still remains with the 1200 strong,
pro-Beijing, nominating committee. The series of protests generated enormous interest
inside and outside of Hong Kong and attracted sizeable international media attention
[2]. Significantly for this article, this media scrutiny spotlighted China’s handling of the
protests, its governance model and censorship rules. China was caught largely un-
awares by the protest movement – with protestors numbering at an estimated 200,000
at its height [3] – as it reacted defensively to media criticism.
The paper argues that the protests did two things with regards to Beijing’s image
construction. First, as a reaction to the highly critical, mostly western, coverage of the
protests, ‘defensive soft power’, through the media, was deployed to challenge these
negative images. Second, the protests allowed Beijing to reinforce existing Chinese-
held national images and also to articulate new images and perceptions of China.
Studies on Chinese protest politics has grown in tandem with the explosion of internet,
social and mobile technologies in China. Lei, for instance, argued that people in
China who relied on the Internet for news are more likely to have differing
views from the government. 1 Looking at more traditional social protests, Xi
Chen’s meticulous and in-depth study of the rise of social protests since the
early 1990s showed how the political structure in China (while it underwent
reform) opened up spaces for social protests. Chen further observed that ‘routinized
contentious’ bargaining eventually strengthens the regime as a mechanism to address
grievances head on.
Yet despite this growing body of literature [5] on domestic protests in China,2 the
literature on the media coverage of protest incidences remains thin [7]. This is puzzling
because ‘media’ and its role in international relations have been highlighted in great
detail.3 Steinhart’s research is one of the few attempts at throwing light unto media
representations of protests events in China. Drawing on an analysis of news media
coverage of major events, he contends that protest incidents in China has not
become more frequent but rather, more visible. He argues that the acceleration
of information through new technologies have strained the authorities’ push to
suppress information, creating openings for political activism to promote pro-
testor sympathising accounts.4
1 [4] See also Benney, J. 2011. Twitter and legal activism in China. Communication, Politics and Culture 4: 5–
20 and Yang, G. 2009. The power of the Internet in China: citizen activism online. New York: Columbia
University Press.
2 [6], also see O’Brien, J.K. ed. 2008. Popular Protest in ChinaMassachusetts: Harvard University Press for a
good overview on such research.
3 [8] See also Carpenter, C. and Drezner, D.W. 2010. International Relations 2.0: The Implications of New
Media for an Old Profession. International Studies Perspectives 11 L 255–272 for the role of new media on
international relations.
4 [7], 120.
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His study however, looks at protest events in mainland China and of media
representations for domestic consumption. There are no studies on media representa-
tions of China, as outwardly projected, as is the case of the Hong Kong 2014 protests.
Furthermore, there are no studies that draw the link between how government re-
sponses to protest incidences can be an exercise of ‘defensive soft power’. This
research goes further by mapping out the expressions of defensive soft power through
the construction of national images. A word about the social movement literature on
Hong Kong is in order here since the ‘Umbrella Movement’ is clearly one. The
integration of Hong Kong into China and China into the global economy has clear
implications for protest spaces and for movements to emerge on both Hong Kong and
the mainland.5 Whilst Hong Kong has had a long history of protest movement, the
return of Hong Kong saw an increase in movements that had a political element as
opposed to purely bread and butter issues [9]. With specific regard to Hong Kong, it has
been argued that the twenty-first century saw an increased ‘politicization’ of welfare
issues as the general populace became more politically aware. This increased concern
and awareness on issues such as the environment, the less privileged and democratic
ideals.6 Drawing on an analysis of three major news outlets, this paper establishes that,
in reaction to negative press coverage, there is a concerted attempt to present and
articulate, through the media, an image of China that its leaders want to reinforce and
project. How this image projection is articulated and promoted is important because it
adds to the understanding of China’s ‘soft power’ and the extent to which it is willing to
wield it and shape perceptions of its rise.
The Umbrella Revolution thus presents itself as a unique case study for three main
reasons. First, it is not a ‘purely’ domestic protest as it is a Special Administrative
Region (SAR). Furthermore, Hong Kong residents and the Chinese government see
each other distinctly albeit under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle. Second,
there was a large amount of international media attention on the protests [10] with most
major western news outlet such as CNN, The Guardian, Bloomberg and many others
featuring the protests heavily. Finally, Hong Kong presents itself as a logical site in
understanding China politically; indeed, many scholars have attempted to look at Hong
Kong to further understand China. Kuah-Pearce and Guiheux, for instance, studied
protest politics in Mainland China and Hong Kong and observed that Hong Kong’s
own political activism influenced and affected Mainland China’s own political activ-
ism. They further note that BThe central government carefully scrutinises Hong Kong
and its evolution because what is happening in the territory has an impact across the
border. Because of Hong Kong’s special status, the Beijing authorities cannot foresee
what could happen one day across the border.^7 This observation is prescient as the
Hong Kong protests of 2014 became that ‘something’ that the Central government
could not predict.
There is also very clear basis for Beijing to be concerned with the protests. Firstly, as
the protests took place in a SAR; the options for managing the demonstrations were
limited. Moreover, as opposed to mainland China, where CCP controls the full scope of
media programming [11] - the media landscape in Hong Kong is much more liberal and
5 [6].
6 [9], 111–112.
7 [6], 12.
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contested. This prevents full control over the media depictions of protests as it has been
able to with regards to mainland protests through censorship and mobilization [12]. Its
response has thus been to primarily respond and react through the media levers it can
control. And it is through these media levers (identified here as popular Chinese online
newspapers) that Beijing attempts to influence and direct the depictions of the protests
and in forming perceptions of the Chinese national image.
National Image(s)
National image is clearly important to China as it is to any country in the international
system. If employed effectively, it can serve a dual function of shoring up domestic
support while expanding a country global and regional influence [13]. It has also been
acknowledged that ‘images’ can be constructed by the state to deliberately influence
and alter other people’s perception of one’s country [14]. Here, ‘national image’ is
strongly associated with Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’. Nye defines ‘soft power’ this way:
BIt is the ability to get others to want what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments.^ [15] He further states that BThis soft power – getting others to
want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.^.8
As this study shows, activities undertaken under the rubric of ‘national image’ can
be ‘defensive’9 as well as ‘offensive’,10 or a combination of both. In the case of the
Hong Kong protests, much of the media reaction sanctioned by the state was a reaction
against the perceived negative ‘attack’ and criticism of China. This reactionary, defen-
sive media response is not something new [17] and many scholars have pointed out the
anti-Western, nationalistic nature of media in China11; what is lacking, though, is an
investigation into the outcomes of such defensive media moves; a conceptual frame-
work to account for these activities under the ambit of national image; and the effects it
has on this national image.
There is no consensus on what constitute a ‘national image’ [18] and the literature on
definitions of ‘national image’ is thin. Several concepts are used interchangeably such
as ‘soft power’ or ‘nation branding’. There have been attempts to quantify ‘national
image’. One example is the Fombrun-RI country index lists twenty items for six12
different scopes of a country’s reputation to outsiders. [19] Another popular way of
measuring and defining national image is the idea of ‘nation branding’ developed by
Simon Anholt [20]. This index (‘Anholt-GfK Roper City Brands Index’) measures
perceptions of countries through polling Bnearly 20,000 people in 20 countries each
year, asking more than 40 questions about their perceptions of 50 countries.^ [21].
It is important to make a distinction here between ‘national identity’ and ‘national
image’. National identity generally refers to an internal, collective schema [22],
whereas ‘national image’ is outwardly directed to gain respect and prestige amongst
8 [15], 5.
9 ‘Offensive’ here refers to the capacities and activities undertaken to attract and enhance a country’s image.
10 . [16] - Callahan does not uses the term ‘offensive’ but uses the word ‘negative’ instead.
11 [17], 73.
12 The 6 dimensions here refer to: emotion appeal; social appeal; physical appeal; financial appeal; leadership
appeal; and cultural appeal.
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others.13 This is an important distinction as it is this outward projection, through the
media Beijing controls, that this research analyses. To be sure, media is just but one tool
(amongst many others such as the military, government institutions, culture etc)
through which one can gaze into how a country projects its national image.
However, media is one of the most direct, pervasive and instantaneous ways to project
images – literally and figuratively yet very understudied with regards to image projec-
tion. More pertinently, the purpose of this research is not to measure the national image
14 of China. Rather, it is to assess how China reacted to perceived criticism of its
national image and how it subsequently took restorative actions to defend and also
advance its national image.
While there is no doubt that countries do engage in attacking other countries images,
the literature on soft power, as mentioned earlier, has largely ignored the ‘offensive’/
’negative’ or ‘defensive’ uses of soft power [16]. In other words, the scholarship on soft
power has generally been prejudicial and predisposed towards the ‘positive’ aspect of
soft power. Even within China, discussions of Chinese soft power rest on and adhere to
Nye’s interpretations of the attractive and positive element inherent in soft power.15 It is
only very recently that scholars like Callahan identified the ‘negative’ aspects of soft
power. He raised the incident where China’s Ambassador to Britain - Liu Xiaoming -
demonized Japan as ‘Voldermort’ as one such instance. He noted that in China, soft
power is Bnegative rather than positive^ and that it is employed Bas a tool in domestic
policy more than in foreign policy .^16 The author agrees with Callahan that there is a
need for a more multi-dimensional view of soft power. His treatment of ‘soft power’
also broadens the analytical utility of Nye’s soft power and allows it to be used to
explore other aspects of soft power more generally. This research builds on Callahan’s
important expansion on ‘soft power’. It moves beyond the positive/negative
dialectic that Callahan adroitly argued and focuses on the ‘defensive’ aspect
of soft power. It argues that soft power can be reactionary and defensive in
nature as well - a characterization that has been well associatedwith China [24]. It
also explores the dynamics in which ‘soft power’ can shift from ‘defensive’ or
‘negative’ to ‘positive’.
Defensive Soft Power
National images are a natural part of a country’s soft power17 and it can therefore be
wielded to expand its influence and incite positive feelings to others on one’s country
through the tools (media, culture, sports, moral values, etc) deployed to promote its
national images. By the same token, the range of tools that a state deploys to defend its
national image falls under the rubric of soft power as well. However, the scholarship on
‘soft power’ is largely silent on this aspect. There is also a fair degree of conceptual
13 See Anholt [20].
14 However, it would be useful to set out the boundaries of which ‘national image’ will be deployed here.
Thus, national image is operationally conceptualized as the positive, negative or mixed feelings, perceptions
and images that other countries and people feel towards one’s country.
15 See [23] and also Nye, J. 2011. The future of power, p. 84. New York: Public Affairs and [16], 3.
16 [16], 2.
17 [13], 4.
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ambiguity with regards to soft power and it is no surprise that it has been criticized for
that. [25] Attempts have been made to clarify and inject further analytical clarity to soft
power. In addition to Callahan’s work, Mattern similarly attempts an expansion and
reformulation of ‘soft power’ in the concept of ‘representational force’. He contends
that representational force opens up a space for coerciveness in ‘attracting’ others to do
what one wants. Specifically, Ba narrative expresses representational force when it is
organised in such a way that it threatens the audience with unthinkable harm unless it
submits, in word and in deed, to the terms of the speaker’s viewpoint.^18 This is an
important analytic refashioning of soft power insofar as it recognises the (potential)
coerciveness of attraction but ultimately falls short in confronting instances where soft
power is deployed (at least initially) defensively as this case study highlights.
There is therefore a need to conceive of an expansion of ‘soft power’ to accommo-
date the defensive and reactionary aspect of the soft power tools employed. Here,
‘defensive soft power’ is conceptualized as the reactionary activities that respond to
perceived attacks and criticism on one’s national image. The conceptualization of
‘defensive soft power’ is not mere semantics; it allows users to look into the intent of
countries and how certain activities, in clearly welding the tools of soft power, welds
them not in the traditionally understood way of ‘soft power’ but rather in a reactionary
but concerted and defensive manner. This defensive soft power can also be opportu-
nistically leveraged upon, as is the case of the Hong Kong protests, to stage counter-
attacks and evolve to promoting positive images of a country in the more ‘traditional’
soft-power sense. Hence, beyond just highlighting the defensive aspect of soft power, it
allows us to peer into process of how soft power morphs.
Analysis of Chinese Media
The importance of media in projecting and disseminating national images is well
documented [27]. One scholar notes that the media reportage on the incident by the
Chinese papers is Bnot for the Hong Kong audience^; rather is Bdirected towards the
United States and Britain^19 and hence points to the outwardly directed nature of the
news coverage of the Umbrella Revolution. Indeed, an interview undertaken with a
protest participant revealed that Hong Kong people, generally, do not read any of the
Mainland newspapers.20 It is also clear that media reports released by the Chinese state
owned media paints the protestors in a very bad light and that Beijing succeeded in
moulding the domestic perception of the occupy movement as ordinary Chinese
people’s perceptions of the event were very negative [28]. So while the domestic utility
of this particular coverage by Chinese papers cannot be denied, 21 neither can the
external dimension of the media campaign22 be dismissed or left unstudied.
18 [26] - An important point to note here is that Mattern’s concept of ‘coercion’ refers not to physical coercion
but is framed in terms of ‘subjectivity coercion’ in which the other party’s socio-linguistically constructed
sense of self is threatened.
19 Dr. Li Hak Yin, interview by author, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, July 7, 2015.
20 Jeffrey Wong, interview by author, Tin Hau, Hong Kong, July 7, 2015. Jeffrey was an active participant of
the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ movement.
21 Dr. Ting Wai, Interview by author, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, July 7, 2015.
22 Dr. Li Hak Yin.
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Media representations – what this study attempts to flesh out – is best analysed
through content analysis. Steinhardt’s methodology in his study of Chinese media
propaganda and popular protests is most helpful.23 He analysed media representations
of domestic protests through the keywords - ‘hostility’ and ‘sympathy’ - in a content
analysis of news media account of 31 major protest events from 2001 to 201024 –
looking at keyword frequency and diachronically comparing media representations and
non-representations through either ‘hostile’ or ‘sympathetic’ reportage. For this re-
search, media content - principally media coverage and editorials by both Chinese and
non-Chinese writers on the protests will be studied. Particular focus will be paid on
how the media reports portray the protestors and the claimed characteristics of China
and its national image. Armony and Velasquez’s study on anti-Chinese online discourse
in Latin America is also instructive. The authors looked at negative Facebook com-
ments in eight leading Spanish-language newspapers from five countries through their
official Facebook profiles. Their study revealed that ‘soft power’ is increasingly
important as China expands its footprint in Latin American, however, Chinese presence
triggered anxiety amongst locals and China’s relations with Latin American countries
also renewed the debate about the development path of these Latin American countries
themselves [29].
Three Chinese newspapers, widely acknowledged as nationalist papers, are selected
for analysis – The Global Times (GT), Xinhua (XH) and China Daily (CD). These three
papers were chosen for three reasons. First, all of them operate popular English
language version of their papers. This is an important consideration because in con-
structing perceptions of China beyond its shores, it has to engage its targeted audience
in a language familiar to them. It has to be noted that there is a significant population of
overseas Chinese (from the Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong), whom mainland
media products compete with overseas editions of liberal Chinese language papers
from Taiwan, Hong Kong and liberal western media as well.25 In this sense, purely
Chinese language papers (which all the aforementioned papers publish) fall outside the
scope of this study. While it is not the aim of this paper to look into perception
contestation between ‘Western’ media and Chinese papers, Chinese attempts to con-
struct their national image were conducted within this dynamic and in opposition
towards English medium news.
Second, beyond the ‘English’ factor, these sites are popular, visited by many non-
Chinese visitors and these three papers presents, very generally, a good range of
popularity – none of these papers were similar in their ‘band’ of popularity. That is
to say, none of these papers are too similar to each other in terms of their popularity. It is
important to get as diverse and as wide a range as possible in order to come as close to
an accurate representation of English-language online news outlet as possible. Some
may argue that major Western newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal or New York
Times should be covered as these papers enjoy far greater credibility and circulation.
However, these western papers were not considered for two main reasons. First, there
were very few, if any at all, that gave space to pro-Beijing editorials and reportage. And
for those that do – I highlight them in a section below. Next, these papers invariably
23 [7], 119–137.
24 [7], 121.
25 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewer for stressing this point.
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entail ceding editorial control and direction if engagements and promotion of messages
were to be staged on those platforms. Nevertheless, it is crucial, for the purposes of this
research that editorial control must be within the grasp of the party as this involves
studying the images they want to promote.
Attached below is a table that shows the site’s popularity and average daily visitor
figures:
News outlet Alexa’s global rank26 Average daily visitors27
Xinhuanet.com 64 529,599
Chinadaily.com.cn 106 281,305
Globaltimes.cn 3,239 51,088
While by no means a representation of ‘Chinese media’, the range of popularity/
traffic and the diverse demographics of visitors make these three sites a good mix of
English language media for analysis. A search on the terms ‘hong kong protests’,
‘umbrella revolution’ and ‘pro-democracy protests’ among others28 will be conducted
through academic LexisNexis as well as on the site’s own search functions. Relevant
editorials are then collected and manually grouped and interpreted to draw out any
underlying patterns across the paper. A total of 117 news articles were looked at: 43
from GT, 39 from XH and 35 from CD which were of relevance and used for analysis.
Additionally, other articles were also looked at under the search terms mentioned above
but these had no relevance to the research at hand or were simply not related to the
protest movement.
While negative coverage by the ‘West’ is not the focus of the paper, it is useful to
discuss it briefly here. Western (global) media organs such as CNN, BCC, The
Guardian, Deutsch Welle, National Post, Time, to name a few, which are based in
North America and Europe. A careful reading of the editorials and media coverage
from these media outlets portray, generally, the Umbrella Revolution and its protestors
in a sympathetic manner. Although there was some space for pro-Beijing views in the
aforementioned outlets, these were the exceptions rather than the norm. Beyond that,
crucially, it framed China as an aggressor and its decision to prevent ‘genuine’ direct
elections as wrong and misguided.29 This view largely aligned with the leaders of the
‘West’ (The United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, France and Germany
amongst others) expressing support and concern about the protests in varying degrees.
The statements of support by states together with the unparalleled, generally negative,
26 These figures were taken from Alexa.com – a web analytics firm - on 10th March 2015. The rankings are
calculated using a combination of average daily visitors to this site and page views on this site over the past 3
months. A rank of #1 would mean it is the most popular site in the world.
27 The average daily visitor figures were obtained from Compete.com on 10th March 2015.
28 A catch all phrase of ‘hong kong’ was used to capture any media content that might not have been captured
through those search terms.
29 A search through the aforementioned news outlet product editorials and reporting that were pro-democracy
leaning. For example, The Guardian ran a sharply critical piece by Chinese dissident Wu’er Kaixi. see China
doesn’t know how to respond to Hong Kong’s umbrella revolution, 2014. The Guardian. http://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/01/china-doesnt-know-how-respond-umbrella-revolution-hong-
kong and Huntsman, J. 2014. China’s Hong Kong Dilemma, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/01/
opinion/huntsman-hong-kong-protests/ amongst others.
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media attention on the Hong Kong protest ‘forced’ China’s hands so to speak – they
had to respond, they had to defend and react. Indeed, the Chinese media readily painted
the protests as a Bconspiracy ,^ one that is Bbacked by America^ [30]. State media outlet
– People’s Daily – went as far as to specify Louisa Greve, a director of the National
Endowment for Democracy of the US as instigating the protests [31]. Additionally,
Western media began to run features and interviews on Joshua Wong – arguably the
face of the protest. He was one of TIME’s most influential teens of 2014 (he was cover
featured in the October 2014 publication); was nominated for TIME’s Person of the
Year 2014 and was also listed by Fortune Magazine as one of the World’s Greatest
Leaders in 2015 at tenth place just seven positions lower than Chinese President Xi
Jinping.30
China as Benign, Restraint and Patient
Claims of China as a revisionist power have dogged China especially when the
contestations over the South and East China Seas began simmering after 2009 in which
various scholars marked as a time of increased assertiveness. 31 While Beijing has
always maintained its ‘peaceful rise’/ ‘peaceful development’ discourse, the Hong
Kong protests afford Beijing an opportunity to show its restraint and its adherence to
the status quo. This representation of ‘status quo’ alignment can be seen in its
‘partiality’ and professed faith towards the Hong Kong government even as it faces
pressure to act directly.
An editorial in the GTon the 29th of September stated that: BThe central government
must firmly support the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in taking resolute
action against radical activities, including drawing the red line of Hong Kong’s rule of
law.^32
Another GT editorial states that BPeople around the world are pursuing democracy,
but this takes time, said Charles Lu, president of the Roundtable of Chinese-American
Organizations, adding that China is moving towards democracy at its own pace, and
that overseas Chinese support the government’s decision and ability to resolve prob-
lems peacefully.^33 Similarly, a CD report noted that BLeung said the authorities have
shown the utmost restraint to the lawbreakers^. [33] Furthermore, a CD editorial by
Professor James Hsiung noted how the central government handled the protests B…this
with self-control, through self-confidence and adherence to principles.^ [34] The
construction of China as one who is confident, restrained and self-assured is an
important defensive move to counter western media criticism of its cluelessness [35]
and how Beijing’s action is harming Hong Kong [36]. More recently, a GT editorial on
30 see Jackson, D. 2015. Leader of Hong Kong’s student protest movement Joshua Wong in Fortune top 10,
Shanghaiist. http://shanghaiist.com/2015/03/28/leader_of_hong_kongs_student_protes.php and Barber, E. 2–
14. Hong Kong Student Leader Joshua Wong Charged With Obstruction, Time. http://time.com/3608696/
occupy-hong-kong-joshua-wong-mong-kok-obstruction.
31 [32], see also Zhang, F. 2011. The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations’, European
Journal of International Relations 19(2): 310–11.
32 See Street movement ruins Hong Kong image, 2014. Global Times, 29 September 2014. http://www.
globaltimes.cn/content/884080.shtml Last accessed June 5, 2015.
33 See Weichi Sun and Du, L. 2014. Overseas Chinese call for peaceful, rational resolution to Hong Kong
protest. Global Times. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/885348.shtml. Last accessed June 16, 2015.
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the 2015 Hong Kong district elections noted that BPolitical parties supportive of the
central government have retained a majority in Hong Kong’s district council elections^
and that the vote showed a Bdesire for stability^ [37]. The story, though, failed to take
into account the in-roads so called ‘Umbrella Soldiers’ (candidates who were partici-
pants in the Umbrella Revolution) made in the elections – in which they won 15 % of
all pro-democracy votes.
A significant surge of highly critical reporting of the Hong Kong police intensified
after the police fired tear gas at the protesting crowd to disperse them on 28 September
2014 [38]. Chinese media had to counter this image with one of restraint and tolerance.
One day after the ‘tear gas incident’, GT released an article praising the police for
bringing order and showing restraint. It quoted a Hong Kong based criminal lawyer as
saying that Bthe police have been restrained in their handling of protesters.^ [39]
Indeed, in the media coverage of events, a common theme emerges across the three
media’s reporting – that the authorities (and relatedly, China) has shown restraint and
has been very patient.
This angle has been taken up even after the protest movement died off. In 2015,
China Daily reported that premier Li Keqiang has reassured people that the central
government would not tighten its policies toward Hong Kong, the Bone country, two
systems^ principle will not be changed, and that Beijing Bwill continue to support Hong
Kong government and its chief executive^ [40]. This was a response against critics who
argued that China would increase its control over Hong Kong34 and once again, put
forth the image of a reasonable and restrained China.
There are two levels to this image construction. First, at the Hong Kong government
level, the police force and the Chief Executive himself has been portrayed as being
patient. This is of course, tied to Bejing’s own handling of the matter - preferring to take
a backseat and trusting the Hong Kong government to manage the incident.
China as a Victim
China has played the ‘victim card’ several times and is frequently employed by China
to gain leverage both to the international and domestic audiences. 35 The protests
allowed China to once again re-inforce the image of China as a victim:
BThe West-supported external forces will continue cheering for Occupy Central.
Exiles will take the Occupy movement as their chance. Their aim is to strike a
heavy blow against China and take it down, but is this the goal of the young
student participants of Occupy Central?^ [41]
34 See Forsythe, M and Gough, N. 2014. Hong Kong Media Worries Over China’s Reach as Ads Disappear.
The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/business/international/hong-kong-media-worries-
over-chinas-reach-as-ads-disappear.html. Last accessed 10 February 2015; and Ortmann, S 2014. Beijing’s
growing influence over Hong Kong. East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/25/beijings-
growing-influence-over-hong-kong/. Last accessed 11 February 2015.
35 See Magnier, M. 2008. China plays victim for its audience. LA Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/
17/world/fg-chispin17. Last accessed June 9, 2015; Woo, A. 2012. China must shed ‘victim’ mentality. South
China Morning Post,. http://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/1103934/china-must-shed-victim-
mentality. Last accessed June 9, 2015.
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But this portrayal is not limited merely to a ‘west against us’ meme as another
Global Times editorial shows: BSociety in the Chinese mainland suffered greatly from
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and keeps vigilant toward any signs of social
disturbance.^ [42] The message conveyed is that China must also guard against internal
problems and not be victims of domestic social troubles. Xinhua similarly reported on
the protests from the ‘victims’ and ‘foreign interference’ angle with the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spoke-person saying that BHong Kong affairs are purely China’s
domestic affairs and China firmly oppose any foreign country’s interference in any
form.^ [43] A search for similar articles throw up repeated news reports that make
identical references to its opposition to foreign interference.36
An editorial in CD by a professor spells out another common thread – that the
students were manipulated by the west as pawns in a political game against China:
BNational Democracy Institute (NDI), under the auspices of the State Depart-
ment, were behind and indeed, were financing, the BOccupy^ movement. In a
Land Destroyer Report, Tony Cartalucci revealed details of a secret meeting
which two opposition leaders from Hong Kong - Martin Lee and Anson
Chan - held at the NED.
There, they confided that the true aim of the "Occupy" movement, planned from
as early as April 2013, was to use Hong Kong as a base to "infect" China with its
Western-style institutions, laws and interests.^ [44]
Indeed, many of these media coverage inveterately make mention of ‘the West’ in
very critical terms. For example, a report on XH in October was entitled ‘China rejects
West’s HK Criticism’ [45]. The same people also published another editorial BChina
Voice: An absurd Hong Kong report by UKMPs^ [46] rebutting the United Kingdom’s
criticism of China’s proposed ‘one man one vote’ system.
Themessaging above reinforces existing internal beliefs and perceptions of China under
siege. As noted earlier, this ‘playing victim’ tactic is frequently invoked and has had,
largely, limited effects on non-Chinese audiences.37 These ‘foreign interference’ articles are
also interesting because they all assume a prori interference. In other words, Chinesemedia
did not simply raise the possibly of foreign interference but took massive foreign western
interference as fact. This position of China as the victim was also deemed ‘necessary’ as a
reaction and a rebuttal to western media who represented China as the ‘bully’.38
Perceptions of Support for China
Drumming up and publicizing the apparent support from elites and the lay person was
most clearly shown in XH. This split is important to construct a perception of support
from the entire stratum of society – from the elites down through to the humblest villager.
36 A search across the three media outlets throws up almost identical news articles and headlines for example:
‘China voices opposition to foreign interference’; ‘China reaffirms opposition to foreign interference’; China
urges UK to stop foreign interference’.
37 Dr. Ting Wai.
38 Hung Wing-lok, interview by author, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, July 7, 2015.
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Chinese media has been quick to tap into apparent support for its cause and its
victimization. These include solicitation and subsequent publication of positive views
to maintaining the status quo. For instance, a XH news editorial noted that different
politicians from different countries ‘expressed disapproval’ of the Occupy Central
protest movement. In that single piece, current and former politicians such as: K
Shanmugam, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Charles Powell, then private secretary to
then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Jeff Bader, who ran Obama’s first
termWhite House’s East Asia policy were cited voicing approval for the sovereignty of
China over Hong Kong and their disapproval for the protests [47].
Beyond the elites, Chinese media has been able to mobilize and publicise support
from ‘everyday’ people. In another piece by XH, Yin Haoliu, a Chinese American
freelancer, was cited in a letter he wrote: Bdemocracy is a step-by-step process that can
not be approached in haste, otherwise it will bring about trouble.^ [48] Yet another
editorial entitled BChinese public voice opposition against HK Occupy Central^ gave
voice to several leading academics in China. Space was also given to a villager from
Rongzhong village who said BWe are angry about the protest. Hong Kong is a free
society but should have rules^, thereby dispelling notions of the protests galvanising a
similar movement in China. Within Hong Kong itself, media attention was given
prominently to people who opposed the movement such as ex-Chief Executive Tung
Chee Hwa (covered across all 3 papers) who urged the student protestors to ‘go home’
and ‘respect the rule of law’. He also said publicly that China would not use force. This
is an important statement coming from Tung as he is the vice-chairman of Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference. Here, once again, through Tung’s words
and the heavy media focus on his discourse, we are able to get a sense of, not only the
views Beijing wanted to convey, but also the image it has consistently tried to project in
response to the media scrutiny the Hong Kong protests were subjected to.
At the grassroots level in Hong Kong, an image was constructed and projected to
highlight the ‘wide’ support the Central government had and the great disdain they held
for the pro-democracy ‘trouble makers’. This tactic frequently involved quoting ‘people
on the streets’, and it is important that these people come from very humble back-
grounds. For example, in a CD article - ‘Cheers for HK police as barricades removed’ -
a newspaper hawker and a security guard were cited expressing their disapprobation on
the protests and fears on their safety and future [49].
One other article in XH claimed that over 1.8 million signatures were collected from
the Hong Kong people opposing the protest which directly counters the western media
depiction of majority support for the protests [50]. Further to that, in view of the large
number of countries expressing concern or openly criticising China,39 it was important
counter measure, to highlight countries that were supportive of China. For instance, XH
gave coverage to Russia’s statement on the protests which noted that BEvents in Hong
Kong belong to China’s internal affairs^ [51].
This is symptomatic of all the China-sympathetic reporting done across the three
media newspaper as a response against pro-democracy media within Hong Kong (and
the western media generally) who frequently invoke humble grassroots support for the
39 See Stacey, K. 2014. UK treads softly over Hong Kong protests,’ Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/61aedf94-47bc-11e4-be7b-00144feab7de.html#axzz3dlWAdNRK and Brunnstrom, D and Wroughton, L.
2014. China facing growing U.S. pressure over Hong Kong protests. Last accessed 20 May 2015.
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Umbrella Movement. Part of the campaign in this push to project a show of inherent
support is also the large amounts of pro-Beijing editorials that were released.40 It is
important to note here that, while limited, pro-Beijing editorials have appeared in
popular media organs such as CNN, Washington Post, New York Times and the
South China Morning Post amongst others.41
Positive Ties with Macau and Taiwan and Students as Law Breakers
In a defensive move over reports and analysis that expressed the possibility of the
protests ‘spreading’ to Taiwan and/or Macau,42 a series of editorials and news reports
were released to showcase strong ties between those region to the mainland while also
‘warning’ them not to get influenced by foreign powers [52].
BI believe that Taiwan has experienced two rounds of alternating political parties and
has been making unremitting efforts to promote the transformation and consolidation of
its democracy. Hong Kong’s Occupy Central for universal suffrage is not a big case in
Taiwan’s democratic process for the Taiwanese people.^ [53] A somewhat subtler
message was also released through editorials in China Daily. One report entitled
‘Macao tourism ‘golden’, HK loses shine’, for instance, highlighted how Macau stood
to gain economically from the tourism fallout in Hong Kong [54], giving Macau’s
economy a much needed boost reinforcing the state sanctioned perception of Hong
Kong’s impending economic demise and the damage done by the protestors.
Additionally, a GT media report - BMacao’s relations with mainland strong despite
Hong Kong protests^ - gave exceptionally glowing reviews of Macau. Mo Shijian,
dean of its Faculty of Law with the University of Macao said that the BMacao people
have chosen cooperation instead of opposition, as majority of its gaming revenue
comes from the Chinese mainland. As an SAR, we have to respect the country’s
sovereignty and systems, and try to strike a balance between regional interest and the
whole country^ [55].
40 These includes: Wang, S-w. 2014. De-Sinicization won’t succeed in Hong Kong. China Daily. http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-10/31/content_18832779.htm; Zhou, B. 2014. Why the rule of lawmust never
be compromised. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-10/29/content_18818363.htm; and
Hsiung, J. 2014. Students trapped in a terrible political game. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
hkedition/2014-10/23/content_18787589.htm. These authors mostly independent non-Beijing affiliated people.
41 See Li, Eric. 2014. The umbrella revolution won’t give Hong Kong democracy. Protesters should stop
calling for it. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/10/06/the-
umbrella-revolution-wont-give-hong-kong-democracy-protesters-should-stop-calling-for-it/, Forsythe, M.
2014. Q. and A.: Michael Tien on Why He Thinks Occupy Central Is a Mistake. New York Times, http://
sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/q-and-a-michael-tien-on-why-he-thinks-occupy-central-is-a-
mistake/, Lo, Alex. 2014. Hong Kong protesters lose support in the name of democracy. South China Morning
Post,. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1610220/hong-kong-protesters-lose-support-
name-democracy?page=all and Chow, R. 2014. Opinion: Hong Kong’s ‘silent majority’ held hostage by
‘Umbrella Revolution’. CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/01/opinion/hong-kong-silent-majority-chow/
42 See Steger, I. 2014. Chinese State Media: Why Can’t Hong Kong Be More Like ‘Content’ Macau?’ Wall
Street Journal http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/12/31/chinese-state-media-why-cant-hong-kong-be-
more-like-content-macau/ and Holliday, K. 2014. Will Hong Kong spark an Asian spring? CNBC.
Available at: http://www.cnbc.com/id/102039726. Last accessed 13 May 2015. These are just a couple of
the numerous articles and editorials (a search on LexisNexis Academic and Google News was conducted
where thousands of hits were registered) where links were drawn on how the protests in Hong Kong would
spread to Taiwan and/or Macau.
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In contrast to the positive valorisation of the protestors, Chinese media sought to
vilify the protestors. Analysing the Chinese materials on the student protests, several
recurring characterisations emerge; framing the protestors as ‘violent’, ‘illegal’ and
‘radical’. Indeed, across all the three media channels, the protestors were almost always
referred to as ‘illegal protestors’, not just ‘protestors’. 43 One XH article notes that
BHong Kong’s prosperity and stability are hard-won and should be treasured, while
Hong Kongers’ free will shall not be held hostage to those organizers of the Occupy
Central movement who have ulterior motives^.44 Also on XH, another pointed out the
illegality of the protest noting how the Bviolent radicals repeatedly provoked and
verbally abused police officers and continuously incited others at the scene to charge
the police cordon lines.^ [56] This ‘violent’ tendency of the students was magnified,
once again, through the voices of ‘normal’ Hong Kongers. One CD reported quoted a
small business owner saying ‘BI’m not worried about speculation that the protesters will
return. I trust in Hong Kong’s rule of law and in the police^, the man said, who wished
to remain anonymous as he fears retaliation from protesters. 45’ The view that the
Chinese media was portraying the students as ‘trouble makers’ during the Umbrella
Revolution was also shared by political observers of Hong Kong.46 Indeed, beyond the
three media outlets analysed here, other media organs that the central authorities
controlled has taken pains to paint the protests a radicals and extremists [57].
That there are radical groupings and that Hong Kong society, by and large, reject
them is not contested. The clearest sign of this was shown during the 2015 district
elections held on 22nd November 2015 where the most radical pro-democracy parties
(People Power and League of Social Democrats) saw their combined vote share shrink
around 60 % [58]. What is contested here than is the meaning of ‘radicals’ and
Beijing’s strategy here is to portray all the pro-democracy groupings as ‘radicals’.
To counter the perception that the academic elites in Hong Kong were supportive of
the protest movement, Chinese media also gave significant spaces to showcasing
academics that were against the protest. These ‘third party’ voices were also used in
the construction of the student protestors in Beijing’s eyes. In one lengthy interview,
Professor Wong Chack-kie, of the Hong Kong government’s central policy unit and
former faculty member of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, claimed that students
were B[...] self-centered people who only persist in their own views. They ignore other
people’s views and political reality, for instance, the central government’s consideration
and the constraints of the Hong Kong government.^ [59] The participating protestors,
while acknowledging there were a small minority of ‘trouble makers’, dismiss the view
that they were largely radicals and out to spread chaos. Indeed, they also viewed the
media attempt to portray them as such as part of a reaction to how the western media
were largely on their side. 47 Indeed, this contestation over ‘democracy’, ‘protests’,
‘governance’ amongst others, is set to continue well into the future as China seeks to
exert greater control over the media and education fields in Hong Kong [60].
43 A search across all the three media channels overwhelming referred the protestors as ‘illegal protestors’
instead of just ‘protestors’.
44 See [48].
45 Emphasis added. See Chui, T, Liu, L. and Li, S. 2014. Police clear Hong Kong protest site’, China Daily.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/27/content_18986193.htm. Last accessed March 10, 2015.
46 Dr. Stan Hok-WuiWong, interview by author, The Chinese University of HongKong, HongKong, July 7, 2015.
47 Jeffrey Wong.
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Conclusion
This research suggests that ‘defensive soft power’ can be deployed to understand the
Chinese government’s response to perceived attacks. Through the mounting of this
defence, certain state-sanctioned images of China are reinforced and promoted.
Specifically, these include promoting images that depict China as a victim; portraying
China as a reasonable and restraint power; constructing the image of wide support for
China’s handling of the event and of its of governance; and promoting the perception of
strong relations between Macau/Taiwan and the mainland. It contends that these state-
aligned images were released defensively to counter the attacks by the western media
and this process allowed the Central authorities an opportunity to reinforce and
articulate its national images. Soft power in international relations has generally been
understood as a way of getting other countries to desire what one wants. This is
achieved using several tools, including the media. As noted earlier, some scholars such
as Callahan, has attempted to broaden this analytical definition and its analytical utility
of soft power. This research contributes to that enterprise by highlighting how the
image construction project in the Umbrella Revolution, is an example of ‘defensive
soft power’ by China. Beyond the defensive aspect, it also shows the ‘reac-
tionary’ aspect of soft power and draws attention to how Chinese foreign policy
behaviour, as shown in this instance, can be reactionary in nature. Additionally,
as this case demonstrates, contrary to popular belief, quick ‘reactionary’ re-
sponses are not necessarily incoherent and disorganized but can display a high
degree of congruence and discipline with the release of state sanctioned
messages.
Next, with regards to its deployment of defensive soft power through the media, two
common tactics were used. The first tactic involved fact-like news reporting
that (1) address, defend and directly refutes attacks on Chinese national image
and ones that (2) promote a positive image of China. The second tactic
involved using seemingly ‘neutral’ editorials - and writers not apparently linked
to the Central authorities - to do the aforementioned to give its coverage a semblance of
non-partisanship.
As costs for more traditional forms of contestation (such as traditional warfare,
economic trade wars amongst others) increases, emergent forms of contestation through
soft power in defending and advancing a nation’s motives, interests and perceptions is
all the more important. These modest findings of China’s images help inform us of
China’s rise and the ways it may seek to defend and seize (back) the initiative in
politically hostile and media un-friendly places.
Finally, it is clear from the findings how concerns about domestic stability cannot be
disentangled from China’s international relations and further highlights the usefulness
of ‘othering’. The pattern of invoking the invisible (or visible) hand of ‘foreign
interference’ is a useful tool to gather (domestically and internationally) support for
Beijing’s position and afford itself more flexibility in manoeuvring and in exerting
control in Hong Kong. Moreover, because Chinese soft power is not as strong
and attractive as American or ‘Western’ soft power, articulating a viable
‘Chinese model’ is fraught with difficulties. As such, these expressions of
Chinese national images are done opportunistically in instances where it could clearly
state what it is not and what it is.
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